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DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE OF DEEDS
T is proposed, in the first part of this paper, to consider the nature
of the delivery of a deed, more particularly a deed of conveyance, and the facts and circumstances which the courts have
rc;,aarded as justifying an inference of delivery. The second part of
the paper will be devoted to a consideration of the necessity of the
acceptance of a deed, in addition to delivery, in order that it may
have a legal operation.

I

DELIVERY

A written instrument, regarded as a constitutive or dispositive
act, becomes legally operative by reason either (r) of the mutual
action of two or more persons, parties in interest thereto, or ( 2) of
the action of one person, from whom the writing may be regarded as
issuing. The mutual action of two or more persons is required in
the case of what are known as simple contracts, while all other instruments, by the theory of the English common law,1 become lc;,aally
operative by the action of one party only. Of such other instruments, some are said to take effect by delivery, this tenn serving to
designate the final act by which one who has previously signed the
instrument, or both signed and sealed it, signifies his intention that
the instrument shall have a legal operation, and so realizes his inten-·
tion in fact. Conveyances of land, including leases, contracts under
seal, mortgages of land and of chattels, deeds of gift, insurance
policies, and promissory notes, take effect by delivery. Of the
instruments which, while becoming operative by the action of one
person alone, are not said to take effect by delivery, the most important class, perhaps the only class, consists of testamentary instruments, wills. But though, in the case of a will. there is no requirement of delivery under that name, nevertheless an instrument ordinarily becomes operative as a will only by virtue of a final express2

See post at note 83.
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ion of intention by the maker to that effect, such expression usually
taking the form, by force of statute, of a declaration in the presence
of witnesses of an intention that the instrument shall be legally
operative, or of a request addressed to witnesses to attest the signature thereto, provided they accede to the request. Such final expression of intention in the case of a will is the equivalent of the final expression of intention by means of delivery in the case of an instrument inter vivos.
The expression "delivery," as applied to a written instrument, had
its inception, it appears,2 in connection with written conveyances of
lands, the manual transfer or "delivery" of which was, in early
times, upon parts of the continent of Europe, regarded as in effect a
symbolical transfer of the land itself, analagous to livery of seisin.
And not only was the notion of physical delivery of the instrument
applied in connection with the transfer of land, but it was applied also in connection with written evidences of contract. the physical
tia.nsfer of the document being necessary to make it legally operative,
and being effective to that end.3 The view that a transfer of land
could be effected by means. of the manual transfer of a writing was
originally adopted in ~ngland to but a limited extent, but in so far as
the courts recognized the effectiveness of a written instrument for
the purpose of transfer or of contract, they adopted the continental
conception of a physical change of possession thereof as a prerequisite to its legal operation, and accordingly the necessity ~f delivery
became established in connection with various classes of written in:struments as they came to be recognized by the courts, particularly
deeds of grant, contracts under ·seal, the only class of contract recognized in the earlier hist9ry of our law, and promissory notes.•
\Vhile, as before stated, the necessity of delivery in connection
with the instruments last named, and other5 of an analagous character, is still fully recognized, the crude conception of a manual transfer of the instrument as the only means of making it legally effective,
which gave birth to the expression "delivery" as used in this connection, has been superseded by the more enlightened view that whether
an instrument has been delivered is a question of intention merely,
there being a sufficient delivery if an intention appears that is shall be
legally operative,5 however this intention may be indicated.6 Ac: Brissaud, Freneh Private Law, (Continental Legal History- Serles} §§ -"!IS. 3D2- 3•3-

z Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, 85, 86.
2

Brissaud, op. cit. § 370. :z Pollock & Maitland, 190.
.As to promissory notes, see article by Professor W. S. Holdsworth. "'The Ea:rly
History of Negotiable Instruments", 3x Law Quart. Rev. al: p. 17.
5 Fit.::patricll v. Brigman, 130 Ala. 450; R.usen v. Mey# 77 Ark. 89; FoII:llU!T v. Iuilorer, 158 Cal. 755; BOfIJers v. CottreU (Idaho}, 96 Pac. 936; Riegd v. Riegel, 243 m 6:z6;
4
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cordingly, it is generally ~crreed that delivery does not necessarily
involve any manual transfer of the instrument ;7 and provided an intention is indicated that the deed shall talce effect, the fact that the
grantor retains possession of the instrumc-nt is immaterial.8 So,
while it is frequently said, both by the ol<ler and later authorities,
that delivery may be made to a third pt•rson for the benefit of the
grantee,9 meaning thereby that_ the convt·yance may take effect by
Burkholder v. Casad, 47 Ind. 418; Sheldon v. Crane (Iowa), 125 N. \V. 238; Doty v.
Barker (Kan.), 97 Pac. 964; B11rk v. Sproat, 96 Mich. 4,14; Ingersoll v. Odendchl, 136
Minn. 428; 162 N. \V. 525; Coulson v. Coulson, 180 Mo. 709; Marlin v. Flaherty, 13
Mont. 96; 32 Pac. 187; 19 L. R. A. 242; 40 Am. St. Rep. 415; Flannery v. Flannery,
99 Neb. 557; 156 N. W. 1065; Vruland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J. Eq. 56; Fisher v. Hall, 41 .
N. Y. 416; Lee v. Parker, 171 N. C. 144; 88 S. E. 217; Mitchell's Lessee v. Rya11, 3
Ohio St. 377; Johns<:n v. Craig (Okla.), 130 Pac. 581; Sapping/ield v. King (Oreg.), 8
L. R. A., N. S. 106; Hannah v. Swarnet, 8 Watts (Pa.), u: McCartney v. McCartney,
93 Tc.'<. 359; J.fatson v. Johnson (Wash.), 93 Pac, 324; Glade Coal Min, Co. V• Harris
(W. Va.), 63 S. E. 873. In Co~ v. Schnerr (Cal.), 156 Pac. 509, it is in effect said
that though the granter intends, in handing the instrument to the grantor, to make It
operative as a conveyance, there is no delivery if it is procured by fraud. This is, it is
submitted, erroneous. The intention exists, and hence there is a delivery, though the
intention is based on a misconception wrongfully induced. There are almost number·
less decisions recognizing that the legal title passes in such case.
•Delivery, being a question of intention, is one of fact, for the jury. Murray
v. Stair, 2 Barn & C. 82; Fitzpatrick v. Brigma1J, 133 Ala. 242; Do11ah11e v. Sweney (Cal.),
153 Pac. 708; Emmons v. Harding, 162 Ind. 154; Braun v. Monroe, 11 Ky. Law Rep.
324; Bishop v. Burke, 207 Mass. 133: O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 130 Minn. 292; 153 N. W.
607; Hurlburt v. Wheeler, 40 N. H. 73; Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279; Crain v.
Wrighr, 36 Hun 74; n4 N. Y. 307; Archambeau v. Edms.nson (Ore.), 171 Pac. 186;
Fisher v. Kean, l \Vatts (Pa.) 278; McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Tex. 359; Dwinell v.
Bliss, 58 Vt. 353; Holly St. Land Co. v. Beyer (Wash.), 93 Pac. 265; Garrett v. Goj/
(W. Va.), 56 S. E. 351; Kittoe V· Willey, 121 Wis. 548•
.. Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Cranshaw (Ala.), 53 So. 812; Faulknu v. Feazel (Ark.),
168 S. \V. 568; Smith v. J.!ay, 3 Penn. (Del.) 233; 50 At. 59; Benneson v. Aiken, 102
Ill. 284; 40 Am. Rep. 592; Prince v. Prince, 258 llL 304; lol N. E. 6u8; Fitzgerald v.
Go/I, 99 Ind. 28; Nc-JJton \'. Bealer, 41 Iowa 334; Pentico v. Hays (Kan.), SS Pac. 738;
Kirby v. H.,lette, 174 Ky. 257; 192 S. W. 63; 9 L. R. A.; Byers v. McClenahan. 6 Gill
& ]. ;150; Creeden V· Mahoney, 193 Mass. 402; Thatcher v. St. Andrews Ch ..rch, 37
Mich. 264; Chastek v. So11ba, 93 Minn. 418; Yo1111g v. Elgi" (Miss.), 27 So. 595; Lee v.
Parker, 171 N. C. 144; 8 S. E. 217: Dukes v. Stang?er, 35 Ohio St. 119; Farrar Y.
Bridges, 5 Humph, (Tenn.), 4n; Matson v. Johnson (Wash.), 93 Pac. 324.
a Doe d. Gamons v. Knight, 5 Barn & C. 671; Xenos v. Wickliam, L. R. 2 H. L.
296; Austin v. Fendall, 2 MacArthur (D. C.) 362; Otis v. Spencer, 102 Ill. 622, 40 Am.
Rep. 617; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind. 109; 17 Am. St. Rep. 345; Bunnell v. Bitnnell, tI r
Ky. 566; J.foorc v. Ha:elton, 9 AIIcn (Mass.) 102; Stevens v. Hatch, 6 Minn. 64; Wall
v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91; 64 Am. Dec. 147: Ruckman v. Ruckman, 32 N. J. Eq. 259;
Scnigham v. Wood, 15 \Vend (N. Y.) 545; 30 Am. Dec. 75; Mitchell's I.essee v. R::l'an,
3 Ohio St. 377; Ledgerwood v. Gault, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 643; Thatcher v. Capcca, 75 \Vash.
249; 134 Pac. 923.
·so the fact that the grantor stiII bas access to the instrument does not conclusiTely
negative delivery. Strickland v. Griswold (Ala.), 43 So. 105; Cribbs v. Walk<r, 74 Ark.
104; Kenni/f v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34; .lluuro v. Bowles, 187 Ill. 346; 54 L. R. A. 864;
Terry v. Glover, 235 Mo. 544; Payne v._ Hallgarlh, 33 Ore. 430; Wilson v. Wilsor.
(Utah), 89 Pac. 643.
9
Shcpp:1:rd's Touchstone, 57; 4 Kent's Comm. 455; Do' d. Garnons v. Knight, 5
Barn & C. 671; X'nos v. Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 312; Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Cran-
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reason of physical transfer of the instrument to a third person, this
would seem to result, not from any particular virtue in the transfer,
but from the fact that the transfer may show an intention to make
the instrument legally operative. A declaration to such third person
of an intention that the deed shall take effect would seem to be quite
as effective as a manual transfer to him, if satisfactorily proven,1"
and would indeed, as affording indubitable evidence of the grantor's
intention, have a conclusiveness that may be lacking in the case of
a mere manual transfer. Such a transfer to a third person, if not
made with the intention that the instrument shall be legally operative,
does not constitute a delivery ;u nor does such a transfer to the
grantee himself, if the transfer is not with such intention, but is for
shau! (Ala.), S3 So. 8I2; Walson v. Hill (Ark.), 186 S. W. 68; Crozer v. White (Cal.),
100 Pac. r30: Clark v. Clark, 183 Ill. 448, 75 Am. St. Rep. n5; Gornel v. McDaniels,
269 Ill. 362, 109 N. E. 996; Malheson v. Ma:lieson, 13;1 I0cwa.5n, 18 L. R. A., N. S.
n67; Hannon ,._ Bower (Kan.), 96 Pac. 51; Beatty v. Beatty, 151 lCy. 547; 1s2 S. W.
s40; Clark v. Cruviell, n2 Md. 339; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Mttc. (Mass.) 412; Cooper
v. Cooper (Mich.), i27 N. W. 266; Barl<lJrd v. Thurston, 86 :Minn. 343; Sneathen T.
Sneathen, IO~ Mo. 20I; 24 .Am.. St. Rep. 326; Iones v. S:ra;y::e, 42 N. J. Law 279;
Church v. Gilman, IS Wend. 656; Robbi'IS v. Roscoe, 120 N. C. 79; 38 L. R. A. 238;
s8 Am. St. Rep.; :Meeks v. Stillwell, 54 Ohio St. 541; Belcl1cr v. La Gra11de Nat. Bk.
(Ore.), l7I Pac. 4Io; Eckman v. Eckman, SS Pa. 269; Kanner v. SJart:: (Tex. Civ.), 203
s. w. 6o3.
Statements, occasionally found, to the effect that the instrument must he handed to
the third person with the intentipn that he pass it on, so to speak, to the grantee named,
(See e. g. Osborne v. Eslinger, 155 Ind. 35I) or that he must pass it on (Furcncs v.
Eid~, I09 Iowa su; Jaskson v. Phipps, 12 Johns (N. Y.) 418), are, it is conceived, absolutely incorrect. The intention of the granter as to whether the instrument shall take
effect as a conveyance is the subject for ascertainment, not his intention, if he happens
to have any, as to the ultimate custody of the writing.
In one state it appears to ·have been decided that a manuel transfer to a third person
can not involve delivery unless such person is a dnly authorized agent of the granter.
Jameson v. Goodwin, (Okla.), 170 Pac. 241. Such a view appears to he entirely out of
harmony with the authorities in other jurisdictions.
'° 3 Preston, Abstracts, 63; Doc d. Gamons v. KnigTit, 5 Barn & C. 671; Xenos v.
Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 312; Linton v. Brown's Admr.s.. (C. C.) 20 Fed. 455; Rushin v.
Shields. n Ga. 636; 56 Am. Dec. 436; :Moore
HaEelton, 9 Allen (Mass.), 102; Regan v.
Howe, I2I Mass. 424; Kane v. Mackin, 9 Smedes & M. (Mass.) 387; Vought's Errs v.
Vought, 50 N. J. Eq. 177; Scrugham v. Wood, 25 Wend (N. Y.) 545; Diehl v. Emig,
• 65 Pa. St. 320; Contra: Moore v. Collins, 15 N. C. 384u Co. Litt. 36a; Sheppard's Touch.ctone, 57; Culver v. Carroll (Ala.), !7 So. 767;
Baker v. Bako?r (Cal), 100 Pac. 892; Merrills v. Swift, IS Conn. 257; P.Jrter v. H'oodhouse, 59 Conn. 568; 22 At. 299; 13 L. R. A. 64; 21 Am. St. Rep. 131; Lange v. Culli
nan, 205 Ill. 365; Connor v • .Buhl, ns Mich. 531; Cannon v. Cannon, 26 N. J. Eq. 316~
Jackson v. Phipps, I2 Johns (N. Y.) 418; Mitchell's Lessee v. R:ran, 3 Ohio St. 377;
Sears v. Scr:<nton Trust Co., 228 Pa. 226; Leftwich v. Early (Va.). 79 S. E. 384;
Showalter v. Spangler (Wash.), 160 P.ac. 1042A statement by the granter of an intention that the conveyance shall be immediately
operative has been regarded as dfcctive as a delivery, although the instrument had been
pre\"iously placed hy him in another's custody to hold in his, the grantor's, behalf. :Moore
v. Trott (Cal.), I22 Pac. 642; Elliott v. Hof!hine, 97 X2n. 26, 154 Pac. 225.
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another purpose as, for instance, to enable him to examine the in
strument.12
In spite however of these numerous decisions recognizing the
minor importance of the matter of actual transfer of the instrument
in connection with the question of delivery, the courts not infrequently speak as if such transfer were an essential in delivery. The
occasional references, moreover, to delivery "to" the grantee, suggest the idea of a physical transfer to him. The delivery of a conveyance or other instrument involves in its essence no delivery "to,,
any one, since it means merely the expression, by word or act, of an
intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, and the fact
that ·in many cases such intention is indicated by the making of a
physical transfer does not show that such transfer is necessary.
The partial survival of the primitive formalism, as it has been well
termed,1 3 which attached some peculiar efficacy to the physical trans.fer of the instrument, as involving a symbolical transfer of the property described therein, is presumably to be attributed to the· fact
that in other connections the words "deliver,, and "delivery,'' as applied to inanimate things, ordinarily have reference to a physical
transfer.
It being conceded that even a voluntary transfer of the instrument
by the grantor to the grantee does not involve a delivery if not with
the intention that the instrument shall be legally operative, i~ necessarily follows that the instrument cannot be regarded as having been
delivered merely because the grantee has acquired possession thereof
without the grantor's consent.u And it has been decided that the
fact of non delivery in such case may be asserted even as against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser, who purchased in reliance on the
grantee's possession of the instrument.15 There are however dicta to
the effect that the grantor may, by reason of his lack of care in the
4

"Bray v. Bray (Ark.), 201 S. \V. 281; Knincy v. Parks, 137 Cal. 527; Osruald v.
Caldwell, 225 Ill. 224; Kavanaugh v. Kat'anaugh, 260 Ill. 179, 103 N. E. 65; Witt v.
Witt (Iowa), 156 N. W. 321; Ball v. Sandlin, 176 Ky. 537, 195 S. W. 1089; Tewksbury
v. Teu-hbury, 222 Mass. 595, 111 N. E. 394; Comer v. Baldwin, 16 Minn. 172; Braman
v. Bingham, 26 N. Y. 483; Ga:y/ord v Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222; Clark v. Clark, 56 Ore.
218, 107 Pac. 23; In re Nicholls, 190 Pa. 308; Gordon v. White, (S. D.), 145 N. \V.
439; Dtci,.ell v. Bliss, 58 Vt. 353; Zoerb v. Paet&, 137 Wis. 59.
u 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2405 •

. IABn.cler v. Barton (Ala.), 52 So. 26; Bowers v. Cottrell (Idaho), 96 Pac. 936;
Lu ..dy v. Mason, 174 Ill. 505; Schaefer v. Purviance, 160 Ind. 63; !lint:: v. Hint~
(Iowa), 156 N. \V. 878; White v. Holder (Ky.), u8 S. W. 995; Westlake \"• Dunn,
184 Mass. 260, lOO Am. St. Rep. 557; Gardiner v. Gardiner (Mich.), 95 N. W. 973;
Aile,. v. Ayer, 26 Ore. 589; King v. Diffey (Tc.'<. Civ.), 192 S. W. 262.
""~ould v. Wise, 97 Cal.· 532; Henry v. Carson, 95 Ind. 412; OgJ,.,. v. Ogden, 4
Ohio St. 458; B11rns v. Keimedy (Ore.), 90 Pac. 1102; Van Amringc v. llforton, 4
\Vhart (Pa.) 382.
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custody of the instrument, be estopped, in favor of a bona fide purchaser, to deny its delivery.16
Apart from any question of bona fide purchase, there are a number
of de~isions to the effect that an instrument of conveyance, the possession of which has been improperly acquired by the grantee named
therein, may be subsequently made operative by the grantor's recognition of the title as being in such grantee.17 In connection with
these decisions the courts ordinarily speak of such recognition as
involving a "ratification" of the deed or of the delivery, but·what actually occurs is, it is conceived, a delivery by the grantor, that is,
an expression of an intention by him, not previously expressed, that
the instrument, which has already passed into the grantee's hands,
shall take effect as a transfer of title. An· instrument which is inoperative as a conveyance for lack of legal delivery cannot be made
operative by ratification, there being indeed, in such case, nothing to
ratify. And likewise a physical transfer of the instrument, which
lacks all legal significance because not made by one authorized to
make delivery, cannot thereafter, by ratification, be transformed into
a legal delivery, that is, an expression of intention that the instrument shall be legally operative.
The delivery of an instrument is a part of the execution thereof,18
and in so far as a written or sealed authority may be necessary to
enable one to sign or seal an instrument as an agent acting in behalf
of the grantor, such an authority is, it is conceived, necessary to
enable one to deliver the instrument as such agent.19 It would be
strange if the final expression of intention, which makes the instrument legally operative,. could be given by one acting under an oral
authority, while the merely preliminary acts of signing anQ. sealing
can be performed by an agent only when acting under autliority in
1

Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532; Allen v. Ayer, 26 Ore. 589; ll!erck v.-Merck, 83 S. C.
v. Risinger (Tex. Civ.), 81 S. \V. 343; Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 \Vis. 55,
n Am. Rep. 546; Laughlin v. Calumet & CMcago Canal & Dock Co., 65 Fed. 44x, x3
C. C. A. 1.
11
Whitney v. Dewey, xo Idaho 633; Phelps v. Pratt, 225 Ill. 85; Harkness v. Cleauu,
113 Iowa 140; McNult:y v. McNulty, 47 Kan. 208; Pannell v. AsketD (Tex. Civ. App.),
•

329; Garner

143

s. w.

18

364.

See Goodlett v. Goodman Coal & Coke Co., 192 Fed. 775, II3 C. C. A. 61; Clark
v. Child, 66 Cal. 87, 4 Pac. xo58; Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 96 Pac. 936; Colee
v. Colee, 122 Ind. 109, 17 Am. St. Rep. 345; McAndrett1 v. Sewell, too Kan. 47, 163
l'ac. 653; Tucker v. Helgie1,1, 102 Minn. 382, n3 N. \V. 912; and other cases cited in
"Words & Phrases" under "Execute."
10 That an agent cannot deliver ~ deed without authority under seal is explicitly
decided in Hibble-JJhite v. J.f'Morine, 6 Mees &.W. 200; Powell v. London & P:rcn:incial
Ba"k (1893), 2 Ch. 555.
So it is said in Sheppard's Touchstone at p. 57, that "where one pexson dclivexs an
instn1ment as the act of anothe> pexson, who is present, no deed conferring an authority
is requisite. But a person cannot, unless authorized by deed, exccntc an instru=t."
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writing. There are however to be found occasional judicial ~tate
ments that a deed may be delivered by one acting under oral author- .
ity,z' and that this may be done is not infrequently assumed by the
courts.:11 That an oral authority is sufficient for this purpose appears to be involved in the decisions, rendered in a number of
states,22 that a conveyance which, at the time it leaves the hands of
the grantor, lacks the name of a grantee, becomes valid if the name
is subsequently inserted by an agent acting under oral authority
from the grantor, th~e decisions apparently involving the assumption that the delivery of the deed is made by such agent, since delivery could_not be made so long_~~ _!4.e instrument, Tu.eking the name
of the grantee, was a legal nullity, and there is no act by the grantor,
after the insertion of such name, which can be referred to as indicative of an intention to deliver.
The view indicated in the decisions referred to, that an agent acting under oral authority may make delivery, is presumably based on
the misconception, previously referred to, that delivery of a deed
means merely the manuaf transfer of the instrument. That an agent
in possession of the instrument in behalf of the grantor is in a position to hand it to the grantee, whether his agency is based on a written or an oral authority, is sufficiently obvious, and because he is in
a position to do this it is assumed that he has the power and authority to make delivery of the instrument on behalf of the grantor.
But delivery of the instrument involves more than a manual transfer thereof, and the fact that the agent is in a position to make
such a transfer is no reason for assuming that he has legal authority to express, by word or act, an intention on the part of the grantor that the instrument shall become legally operative. It no doubt
frequently occurs that the grantor hands the completed instrument
to an agent, with oral instructions to hand it to the grantee upon
some subsequent event, .ordinarily the payment of the purchase mon"'White v. ·Duggan, 140 Mass. 18, 54 Am. Rep. 437; Macurda' v. Fuller, 225 Mass.
341, II4 N. E. 366; Laf!ert~· v. Lafferty, .µ W. Va. 783; See Huffcut, Agency (2nd ed.),
p. 38.
.
=sturtewnt v. Sturtevant, n6 Ill. 340; Furenes v. Eide, IO!) Iowa sn; Conwa.v v.
Roel:, 139 Iowa 162; Sar.taquin Min. Co. v. High Roller Min. Co., 25 Utah 282; Spring
Garden Bank V· Hulings Lumber Cu., 32 W. Va., 357, 3 L. R. A. 583.
=Hall v. Kary, 133 Iowa 465, no N. W. 930, II9 Am. St. Rep. 639; Guthrie v.
Field, 85 Kan. 58, n6 Pac. 217, 37 L. R. A., N. S. 326; Inhabitants of South Berwick
v. Huntress, 53 Mc. 90; Board of Education of Minneapolis v. Hughes, n8 Minn. 404,
136 N. W. 1095, 41 L. R. A., N. S. 637; Th11mmel v. Holden, 169 Mo. 677; Montgomery
v. Dre.r'lur, 90 Neb. 632, 134 N. W. 251, 38 L. R. A., N. S. 423; Hemmenwa.y v. Mu·
lock, 56 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 38; Cribben v. Deal, 21 Ore. 2u, 28 .Am. St. Rep. 746;
LIJ1fSOr v. Simpson, 1 Rich Eq. (S. C.) 71, 42 Am. Dec. 345; Threadgill v. Butler, 60
Tex. 599; Clemmons v. McGeer (Wash.), ns Pac. 1081; Lafferty v. Lafferty, 42 W. Va.
783; Friend v. Yahr, 126 Wis. 291, I L. R. A., N. S. 891, no Am. St. Rep. 924.
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ey. In such case, however, the delivery, it is conceived, is properly
to be regarded as a conditional delivery made by the grantor himself, a deliver}' made by him, that is, at the time of handing the
instrument to his agent, conditioned however upon the subsequent
payment of the purchase money or occurrence of the other event
named, on which the agent was to hand the instrument to the grantee. Upon the satisfaction of the condition the delivery by the
grantor becomes effective, as in the case of any other conditional delivery,23 and the mere act of the agent in handing the instrument to
the grantee is not, technically speaking, a delivery thereof, it having
already been delivered.
Since the delivery must be made by the grantor, or by the grantor's agent, in order to be effective, there can be no delivery after the
grantor's death. A deceased grantor can obviously not make delivery, and the agent's authority necessarily comes to an end upon
the death of the principal.24
It is not infrequently said that there is no delivery if the grantor
still retains control or dominion over the deed.25 Such a statement
is somewhat ambiguous. The mere fact that the grantor retains
possession of the instrument is, as above indicated,26 . not incompatible with delivery, and yet it can hardly be said that, having possession of the deed, he has no dominion or control thereover. The
statement may mean that the fact that the grantor has a right to
demand the physical possession of the instrument, or to refuse to
relinquish such possession, conclusively shows that the instrument
has not been delivered since, after delivery, the grantee, and not the
grantor, is· entitled to control the possession. of the instrument, it
being his muniment of title: Or it may mean that the fact that the
grantor has a right to determine whether the instrument shall have
23 See an article by the present writer on "Conditional Delivery of Deeds", 14 Columbia Law Rev. 389.
"'Mortgage· Trust Co. v. Moore, 150 Ind. 465; Sclsae/er v. Anchor Mutual Fire
Insur. Co., n3 Iowa 652; Colyer v. Hayden, 94 Ky. 180; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185,
60 Am. Rep. 291; Givens v. Ott, 222 Mo. 395; Meikle v. Cloquet (\VaslL), 87 Pac. 841.
""Sec c. g. Tarwater v. Going, 140 Ala. 273; Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 ConIL 568,
21 Am. St. Rep. 131, 13 L. R. A. 64; Rutledge v. Montgomery, 30 Ga. 899; Callerand
v. Piot, 241 Ill. 120; Pethel v. Pet1'el (Ind. App.), 90 N. E. 102; Kirby v. Hulette,
174 Ky. 257, 192 S. W. 63; Renehan v. l>fcAvoy (Md.), 81 At. 586; Joslin v. Goddard,
187 Mass. 165; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 285; Ingersoll v. Odendahl, 236 M"mn. .;28, 162
N. W. 525; Hall v. Waddill, 78 ]\fiss. 16; Peters v. Berkmcier, 184 Mo. 393; Baker v.
Haskell, 47 N. H. 479, 93 Am. Dec. 455; Fisher v. Hall, .;1 N. Y. 416; Gayford v· Ga,~
lord, 150 N:. C. 222; Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. D. 475, 41 L. R. A. 258; Ball v.
Foremari, 37 Ohio St. 139; Eckman v. Eckman, SS Pa. St. 269; Johnson v. Johnson, 24
R. I. 571; M.•rck v. Merck, 83 S. C.· 329; Cassidy v. Holland (S. D.), 130 N. \V. 777;
Gaines v. Keener, 48 W. Va. 56; B ..tts v. Rit:1'ards, 152 Wis. 318, %40 N. W. 7.
Ante note 8.
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a legal operation shows that it has not been delivered, since after
delivery he has no such right. But since the question whether the_
grantor has the right of control as regards either possession of ·the ·
instrument or its legal operation depends on whether there has been
a delivery, the statement refen:ed to amounts to little more than a
statement that, so long as the instrument is subject to the grantor's
control by reason of lack of delivery, the instrument has not been
delivered. The statement is unquestionably correct, but appears to
be of questionable utility, and its frequent repetition is calculated to
obscure, rather than to clarify, the nature of delivery.
In connection with the question of the delivery of a deed, various
rules of presumption have been judicially asserted, that is, particular states of fact have been regarded as showing prima f acic, that
the instrument has or has not been delivered.
It has been said that the fact that the instrument remains in the
possession of the ·grantor raises a presumption that it has not been
delivered.:rr This appears to be merely another·way of saying that
delivery is an affirmative :fact, the burden of proving which is upon
the person alleging it. If he cannot support this burden by evidence
of a change of possession of the instrument, he must support it by
other evidence.28
While a presumption of non delivery is said ordinarily to arise
from the grantor's possession of the instrument, no such presumption arises, it is said, if the grantor, by the terms of the instrument,
reserves a life estate in the property, for the reason that there is no
object in such a reservation unless the instrument is to operate before the grantor's death.29 That such a reservation shows that the
instrument was prepared with the intention that its operation should
not be postponed till the grantor's death may be conceded, but it is
difficult to see what bearing this has on the question of delivery,
since the form of the instrument, even without the reservation,
shows that it was prepared with this intention. It might as well be
said that any instrument in the form of a conveyance inter vivos as
distinguished from a will, though still in the possession of the grant"'Donahue v. Smeeny (Cd.),. 153 Pac. 708; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 260 Ill. 179,
103 N. E. 65; Slsdler v. Srt:f11Grt, 133 Iowa 320; Dunbar v. Meadows, 16; ·Ky. 275, 176
S. W. 1167; I;Judles v. Nickerson (Me.), 78 At. 100: Cassid3 v. Holland (S. D.), 130
N. W. 711; Burrs v. Richards, 152 Wl!J. 318, 140 N. W. 1.
""See Ienlins v. SoufMrn Railway Co., 109 Ga. 35; BurlotJ v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 1;
Ptr.rers v. Ru:rsell, 13 Pick (Mass.) 69; Bisard v. Sparks, 133 Mich. 587; Ligon v. Barton,
88 Miss. 135; T::;ler v. HGJI, 106 Mo. 313, 27 Am. St. Rep. 338; Arwood v. Atwood,
15 V.'ash. 285; Gaines v. Keener, 4S W. Va. 56; Burts v. Richards (Wis.). 140 N. ,V. 1•
.. Hill v. Krt:iger, 250 Ill. 408; Brick v. Garber, 261 Ill 378, 103 N. E. 1059; Collins
v. Smith (Iowa), 122 N. W. 839; SnearTien v. Sneafhen, 104 Mo. 201; Williams v.
Latham, 113 Mo. 165; Ball v. Foreman, 37 Ohio St. 132.
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or, is to. be presumed to have been' delivered, sine~ it would not
have been prepared in that form had it not been intended to op~~
before the grantor's death. Delivery is, as above indicated, the final
expression, subsequent to the signing and sealing, of an intention
that the instrument shall be legally operative, and whatever the fonn
of the instrument, it cannot well constitute the basis for an inference
that, subsequent to the signing and sealing, such intention was expressed.80
It has furthermore been said that the grantor's retention of the
instrument does not give rise to a presumption of non-delivery if
he retains an interest in the property and it is consequently to his
advantage that the instrument be preserved.31 It is however difficult
to see that, in the ordinary case, it is to'his advantage that the instrument be preserved, if its effect is to divest him of either the whole
interest or a partial interest in the prQperty. He would in either
case be better off if the instrument were no longer available for the
purpose of asserting h{s grantee's rights thereunder.
That the instrument is in the possession of the grantee named
therein is usually referred to as raising a presumption that it has
been delivered,82 based, it would seem, on the probability that the
grantor gave him possession of the instrument, and the improbability
that the grantor would vest him with such a mnniment of title unless
he intended that the title should pass.
In England and Massachusetts there are decisions to the effect
that the signing and sealing of the instrument in the presence of an
attesting witness raises a presumption of delivery,113 the effect of
which presumption would be to justify a finding of delivery, although
the instrument is still in the grantor's possession, upon evidence that
it was signed and sealed by him. Such a presumption does riot appear to have been recognized elsewhere, and it may perhaps be regarded as based on a recognized practice, in the jurisdictions named,
30

Sec Whitney v. Dewes, IO Idaho 633, 655, So Pac. III7, 69 L. R. A. 572; Colyer

v. H~·den, 94 Ky. I8o.
31

Blakemore v. Byrnsid2, 7 Ark. 504; Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. I94; Scnlglzam v.
Wood, IS \Vend. 545.
02 Gai11es v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 322; Simmons v. Simmons, 78 Ala. 365; TJwmpso11 v.
:McKenna (Cal. App.), I33 Pac. 5I2; Hill v. Merritt (Ga.), 91 S. E. 204; Inman v.
Swearingen, I98 IIL 437; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 Ill. 92, IOI N. E. 227; Hild v. Hild,
129 Iowa 649, II3 Am. St. Rep. 500; Fish v. Poorman, 85 Kan. .z37; Ball v. Sandlin,
I76 Ky. 537, 195 S. W. 1089; Valentine v. Wheeler, n6 Mass. 478; Barras v. Barras
<Mich.), 159 N. W. 147; Wilson v. Wilson, 85 Neb. 167; Pierson v. Fisher, 48 Ore. 223;
Painter v. Campbell, 207 Pa. 189; Jackson v. Lamar (Wash.), 108 Pac. 946.
""Hall v. Bainbridge,u 12 Q. B. 699; Hope v. Harman, 16 Q. B. 751, note; Burlin!!
v. Paterson, 9 C. & P. 570; :Moore v. Ha::ellon, 9 Allen (Mass.) 102; Howe v. H01Ve,
99 Mass. SS.
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of making delivery of the instrument by a declaration to that effect
in the presence of witnesses at the time of signing and sealing.M
The propriety of such an inference of delivery from the mere fact
of signing and sealing might indeed depend on the particular circumstances of the case, for instance on the presence or absence of
the grantee. That the grantor signs and seals the instrument in the
presence of the grantee may justify an inference of delivery, while
his doing so in the grantee's absence may not.35
That the attestation tjause, under which the witnesses write their
names, recites the delivery of the instrument, has occasionally been
regarded as creating a presumption -of- delivery,38 while a contrary
view has also been expressed.37 Such a fact might properly, it
would seem, be regarded as evidence sufficient to support a finding
of delivery, but whether it should be regarded' as creating a presumption of delivery, in the sense of requiring a finding of delivery
in the absence of countervailing evidence, appears questionable.38
Upon the question whether the fact that an instrument is acknowledged raises a presumption of delivery the cases ai:e few and unsatisfactory. That it does not has occasionally been' decided,39 but
there are a greater number of decisions to an opposite effect.40
'The fact that the instrument is acknowledged in the presence of the
grantee might operate to create an inference in this regard which
31 See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 10, p. 385; \Villiams, Real Prop. (18th ed.)
149: Xenos v. lFicklram, L. R. 2 H. L. 296, 320.
.. Sec Shtlton's Case, Cro. Ely 7; Levister v. Hilliard, 57 N. C. 12. "If both parties
be present, and the usual formalities of execution take place, and the contract is to all
appearances consummated without any conditions or qualifications annexed, it is a com·
plete and \•alid deed, notwithstanding it be left in the custody of the grantor." 4 Kent's
Comm. 453, quoted and applied in Scrugliom V· Wood, 15 Wend (N. Y) 545; Wallace
v. Berdell, 97 N. Y. 13.
.. Xenos v. Wickham, L. R. 2 H. L. 296; Evans v. Gres, 9 L. R. Id. 539; Clark v.
Akers, 16 Kan. 166, (semble); Hall v. Sears, 210 Mass. 185; Diehl v. Einig, Gs Pa. 320;
Currie v. Donald, 2 \Vash. (Va.) 58.
:rt Rushin v. Sliield, I I Ga. 636; Hill v. llfcNichol, So Me. 209; Fisher v. Hall, 41
N. Y. 416.
""That it may furnish evidence of delivery see Dennis v. Dennis, Il9 Mich. 380, 78
N. \V. 333; Hill v- 1\ferritt (Ga.), 91 S. E. 204 (semble).
""Braun v. Monroe, I I Ky. Law Rep. 324; Den v. Farlee, 21 N. J. L. 279; Kille
v. Ege, 79 Pa. 15.
'°Boyd v. Slasb:JCk, 63 Cal. 493; New Haven Trust Co. v. Camp, 81 Conn. 539, 71
At. 788; Baker v. Updike, 155 Ill. 54; Burton v. Eosd, 7 Kan. 17; Goi:in v. De Miranda,
76 Hun (N. Y.) 414, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1019; Tarlton v. Griggs, 131 N. C. 2t6, 233;
H:u11p!1rey v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 35.
In Alexander v. De Kennel, 81 Ky. 345, it was decided that acknowledgement did
not create a Pre!illmption of delivery for the reason that the concurrence of the grantee
is necessarr. This however involves another question, that of the ncce>~ity of accept·
ance.
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an acknowledgment out of his presence would not create.u Soine
weight might also be imputed to the language of the certificate of
acknowledgment, an acknowledgment in express terms that the
grantor delivered the instrument being perhaps entitled to more
weight than an acknowledgment merely that .he executed it.4 H~
The usage of the community as to the time and manner of making
acknowledgments might also have a bearing in this regard.45 It
would seem on the whole desirable that the courts refrain from the
assertion of a presumption of delivery from acknowledgment.
but rather leave it to the jury to determine whether the circumstances
of the particular case show an intention on the part of the grantor
that the instrument shall be legally operative.4 G In several cases it
is in effect decided that a finding of delivery cannot be based on the
fact of acknowledgment alone.47
The question may arise· in. this connection of the effect of a statute, such as e.....:ists in a number of states, making an instrument, if
duly acknowledged, admissible without further proof of execution.
In one state such a statut~ has been regarded as ptacing on the opposite party the-burden of show~ng non-delivery' 5 but this does not
appear to accord with decisions in other jurisdictions that the authentication of a document sufficient to render· it admissible in evidence
does not necessarily create a presumption of its execution.~9
That the grantor has the instrument recorded, or leaves it with
the proper official for record, has been frequently referred to
raising a presumption of delivery.50 This amounts in effect to a

as

41 See Scrugham v. Wood, 15 Wend (N. Y.) 545; Delaplain v. Grubb, 44 W. Va.
612; Adams v. Baker, 50 W. Va. 249, 40 S. E. 356•
.._..See Hawes v. Hawes, 177 Ill. 409; Den v. Farlee, 21 N. J. L. 279; Blight v.
Schenck, 10 Pa. 2S5.
• ·
""In Braun v. Monroe, tt Ky. Law Rep. 324, it is said that the acknowledgment
raises a presumption of delivery because the instrument ought to be delivered before
acknowledgment. This cannot well be said in all communities.
44 That the acknowledgment is merely evidence bearing on the question appears to
be recognized in Fergusen v. Bond, 39 W. ·va. 566; Hutchinson v. Rust, 2 Gratt (Va.)_
394·
.
• 1 Humphrey v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 35; Wiggins v. Lusk,
12 Ill. 132; Baker v. Updike, 155 Ill. 54; Burton v. Boyd, 7 Kan. 17; Gtn'in v. De M~
randa, 76 Hun 414, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1019•
.. Tucker v. Helgren, 102 Minn. 382.
•• A11derson v. Cuthbert, 103 Ga. 767: Scott v. Delany, 87 IlL 146; Ross v. Gould,
5 Me. 204; Siegfried v. Levan, 6 Sergt. R. 308; Bogle v. Sulli·::ant, l Call CVa.) 561.
See 3 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2135.
.
., Leans v. Watson, '9& Ala. 479, 39 Am. St. Rep. 82; Lee Hardware Co. v. Johnson
(Ark.), 201 S. ,V. !!89; Ellis v. Clark, 39 Fla. 714; Creigl1ton v. Roe, 218 Ill. 619, :i:o9
Am. St. Rep. 310; Blackc11sliip v. Hall, ;<33 Ill. n6; Colee v •. Colee, 122 Ind. 109;
H11tto11 v. Smith, 88 Iowa !!38; Lay v. Las (Ky.), 66 S. W. 371; Holmes v. McDonald,
n9 Mich. 563, 75, Am. St. Rep. 430; Griffin v. Hor:ey (Mich.), 146 N. W. :10; Inger·
soll v. Odendahl, 136 l\linn. 428, 162 N. W. 525; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262;
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statement that such action on the part of the grantor shows, prima
facie, an intention on his part that the instrument shall be legally operative. It is, in the ordinary case, difficult to see any object in leaving the instrument for record, unless it is intended that it shall operate as a conveyance, and the rule of presumption referred to appears to be founded in reason. In a few states only does this view
appear to have been actually repudiated, and it is not always clear,
in these states, why such an effect is denied to the grantor's conduct
in this regard.51 In a very considerable number of cases it is said
that the action of the grantor in having the instrument recorded does
not show delivery if this was without the knowledge or consent of
the grantee,52 but this introduces another question, that of the necessity of acceptance of a conveyance, which properly calls for separate discussion,5 3 and these cases cannot generally be regarded as
involving a repudiation of the view that the action of the grantor
in having the instrument recorded shows, printa facie, an intention
that it shall take effect as a conveyance. The presumption of delivery, based on the action of the grantor in having the instrument recorded, is recognized as being subject to rebuttal by evidence that
he did not intend the instrument to operate as a conveyance.H
In several cases the fact that the purpose of the conveyance was
Mitcl1ell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Robbins v. Roscoe, I2o N. C. 79r, 38 L. R. A.
238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774; Thompson v. Jones, x Head (Tenn.) 574; Davis v. Garrett,
91 Tenn. I47; Newton v. Emerson, 66 Tex. 142; Bjmcrland v. Ely, IS Wash. IOI.
01 See Egan v. Horrigan, 96 Me. 46.
In McMan11s v. Com111ow, to N. D. 340, the
decision to this effect is based on an ill-advised statute undertaking to state what con·
stitutes delivery. In Massachusetts this position appears to be in part the result of the
view (post at note 81) that there must be knowledge of or assent to the conveyance on
the part of the grantee. (See Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 456; Samson v. Thorn·
tor., 3 Mete. 275), and in part of the notion that delivery of a deed means the physical
transfer of the instrument. Hau•kes v. Pike, ro5 Mass. 560; 7 Am. St. Rep. 554;
Barnes v. Barnes, I6r Mass. 38r. The legislature has now intervened by making the
record of a eonve::(ance conclusive evidence of delivery in favor of a bona fide pur·
chaser. See Rev. Laws, c. 127, § 5.
""Yo11ng v. G11ilbean, 3 Wall (U. S.) 636; Parmelee v. Simpson, 5 \Vall 81; Kno:r:
v. Clark (Col.), 62 Pac. 334; Sullivan v. Edd;:,', I54 Ill. 199; Wilcnon v. Handlon, 207
ill. Io4; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191; O'Cor.nor v. O'Connor, 100 Iowa 476; Ale:r:at1der v. De Kermel, 81 Ky. 345; Oxnard V• Blake, 45 Me. 602; Maynard v. Mayt1ard,
xo Mass. 456, 6 Am. Dec. I46; Samson v. Thornton, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 275, 37 Am. Dec.
IJ5; Bullitt v. Taylor, 34 l\liss. 708, 69 Am. Dec. 412; Cravens \". Rossiter, u6 Mo. 338,
38 Am. St. Rep. 606; Der,.y Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 264; Jacksot1 v. Phipps, u
Johns \N. Y.) 418; King v. At1trim Lumber Co. (Okla.), 172 P:ic. 958; Bogard v.
Barham (Ore.), 108 Pac. 214"'_Post at note 8I et s~q. ·
"'Humiston v. Humiston, 66 Conn. 579; Jo11es "· B11sh, 4 Harr (Del.) 1; Ellis v.
Clark, 39 Fla. 714; S11Tliva" v. Eddy, I54 Ill. 199: l'a11ghm1 v. Vaugflan, 94 Ind. I9;
Hutton v. Smith, 88 Iowa 238; Hogadone v. Gra1111r M11t. Fire Ins. Co., 133 Mich. 339;
Barras v. Barras (Mich.), 159 N. \V. 147; Babbitt "· Bc11t1ett, 68 Minn. 260; Metcalfe v.
Brandon, 60 Miss. 685; Boardman v. Dana, J-1 l'a. 252; Tltompso" v. Jo11es, Head
(Tenn.) 576; Walsli V. Vermont Mui. Fire Ins. Co., 54 Vt. 351.
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merely to prevent the assertion or collection of a claim by a third
person against the grantor and not to vest a beneficial interest in the
grantee, has been regarded as precluding, or at least as tending to
preclude, any inference of aelivery from the grantor's action in recording the instrument.55 Such a view appears, however, to be open
to question. The instrument cannot operate in any degree for his
protection unless it operates as a conveyance, and the fact that he
desires protection would seem to be rather an additional reason for
regarding the instrument -as having become operative by delivery.58
Even conceding that his purpose to avoid payment of claims would
show that there was no delivery, it might be questioned whether he,
or one claiming in his right, should be allowed to assert that the ordinary inference from his use of the recording system should not be
drawn, because he made such use for purposes of deception.
That the grantor, after having the instrument recorded,· himself
obtains it from the recc:-<ling officer, instead of leaving it with the
latter to be called for by the grantee, does not appear to have any
proper bearing upon the question of the grantor's intention in having
it recorded. 57 Even though there were the fullest intention on the
part of the grantor that the instrument should become legally effectiYe, he might well desire to have it returned to him to hold temporarily. The fact however that the grantor not only obtains the instrument after its record, but retains it in his possession, has been regarded as showing that it has not been delivered.58 Conceding that
the record of the instrument by the grantor is sufficient in itself
to make a prima facie showing of delivery, it is not entirely clear
why his subsequent retention of the instrument should be regarded
as showing a different intention. That the grantor has the instrument recorded might properly, it is submitted, overcome any inference of non-delivery from his subsequent possession of the in""Coulsnn v. Scott (Ala.), 52 So. 436; Union M ..t. Life I..s. Co. v. Campbell, 95
lit. 267, 35 Am. Rep. 166; Weber v. Christe.I!, 121 IIL 98; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind.
19; Dads v. Dai.;s, 92 Iowa 147; Egan v. Horrigan, 96 ?.'Ce. 46; Hogadonc v. Grange
Jfot. Fire Ins Co., 133 Mich. 339; Hooper v. Vanstrom, 92 Minn. 406; Koppelmann v.
Koppelmann, 94 Tex. 40, 57 S. W. 570; Elmore v. Marks, 39 VL 538.
~ 5t!e Decker v. Stansbury, 249 Ill. 487; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 ?i.fo. ,:,62; Cor1c:r
v. C<.>rlcy, 2 Cold (Tenn.) 520.
01 ~ec Lewis v. Watson, 98 Ala. 480, 22 L. R. A. 297; Russcli v. May, 77 Ark. 8!);
Moore v. Giles, 49 Conn. ;70; Allen v. Jfoglics, 106 Ga. 775; Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind.
10 9 ; Collins v. Smith (fowa), 122 N. W. 839; Las v. Lay (Ky.), 66 S. \V. 371: 11fitch·
ell's Lesset! v. R:,.an, 3 Ohio St. 377; Tlwnrf'son v. Jones, t Head (Tenn.) 5;6. Bnt
IVebcr v. Cliristen, 121 Ill. 98 is :lJl1':1n-ntly cc11tra•
.. Weber v. Christel!, 121 Ill. 98; l111ttou v. Smith, 88. Iowa .238; Jourdain v. Paitu·
S()n, I02 Mich. 602; Babbitt \« Ba"1•ilt, 68 Minn. 260; Elmore v. Marks, 39 VL 538;
FoJirliavcn .Marbli: Co. \". Otuc11s, 69 Vt. 749. See Kitig v. Antrim Lumber Co. (Okla.).
172 Pac. 958.

JJELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE OF DEEDS

II7

strument, since, as before remarked, it is difficult to conceive of any
object in having it recorded other than that it should be legally operative.
It being conceded that a manual transfer of the instrument by the
grantor directly to the recording offin-r shows, prima facie, an intention that it shall operate as a conveyance, it would seem that his
transfer of the instrument to another, to be by the latter handed to
the recording officer, might likewise show such an intention, and
there are decisions to that effect.Go
It has been frequently asserted that the mere fact that the instrument is of record raises a presumption of delivery, without any
reference being made to the identity of .the person who had it recorded.60 The cases do not ordinarily indicate the basis of this presumption, but occasionally61 it has been regarded as based, to some
extent at least, upon the statutory provisions, existent in most of the
states62 making an instrument, duly acknowledged or proved, and recorded, or a copy thereof, admissible without further proof. But
this latter view does not appear to ac;cord with the authorities, before
referred to,63 that the authentication of an instrument sufficient to
justify its admission in evidence does not create a presumption of
its due execution. A more satisfactory reason for inferring delivery
from the fact that the instrument is of record would seem to be the
probability that it was placed on record either by the grantor, this
indicating an intention on his part to make it operative,64 or by the
grantee, this indicating that it was in his possession, which itself
raises a presumption of delivery.65 Any presumption arising from
the mere fact of record might be overthrown by evidence that the
instrument was not placed on record by the authority of either the
.. Tennesee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 125 Ala. 538; Zeigler v. Daniel
(Ark.); l!l4 S. ,V. 246; Va/ta v. Blavka, I95 Ill. 6Io; 111 re Bell's Estate (Iowa), I30
N. ,V. 798; Robbins v. Roscoe, 120 N. C. 79, 39 L. R. A. 238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774;
Thompson v. Jones, I Head (Tenn.) 576; Bates v. Winters, 138 Wis. 673, 120 N. ,V. 498.
""Estes v. German Nat· Bank, 62 Ark. 7; Parker v. Salmons, IOI Ga. I6o, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 29I; Spencer v. Rayor, 25I Ill. 278; Witt v. Witt (Iowa), I56 N. ,V. 32I;
Balin v. Osola (Kan.), 9I Pac. 57: Maynard v. Maynard, I45 Ky. 197; Patrick v.
H=ard, 47 :Mich. 40; Sweetland v. Buell, I64 N. Y. 54I, 79 Am. St. Rep. 676; Stephenson v. Van Bloklatsd (Ore.), n8 Pac. I026; McDaniel v. Anderson, 19 S. C. 2n;
Morgan v. Morgan, 82 Vt. 243; Wlziting v. Hoglund, I27 \Vis. I35; Laughlin v. Calumet
& Chicago Canal & Dock Co., I3 C. C. A. I, Fed. 441.
01 See Napier v. Elliott (Ala). 58 So. 435; Jackson v. Perkins, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 317;
1.filcl1ell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377; Goodlett v. Goodman Coal & Coke Co., I92
Fed. 775, u3 C. C. A. 6I.
CThese statutes are summarized in 3 'Vigmore, Evidence, §§ 165I, 1676.
03 Ante note 49.
°'Ante note 50.
es Ante note 32.
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grantor or grantee,66 or__ by_other evidence to the effect that-there
was no delivery.67
That the parties to the instrument acted as if the title to the property had passed to the grantee named has been regarded as showing,
or tending to show, delivery.08 In regard to this it may be said that,
while the fact that the grantor named acts as if the title had passed
to the grantee named would appear to be strong evidence of his intention that the instrument should operate to pass the title,69 that
the grantee named so acts would appear to have little or no evidential value in this regard.
It was said by Chancellor Kent, in a quite early New York case,70
that a voluntary settlement is valid, even though the grantor retains
possession of the instrument, in the absence of other circumstances
to show that it is not intended to be absolute. In view of the fact,
well recognized at the present day, if not at that time, that not only
a voluntary settlement, but any conveyance, may be effective although the physical possession of the instrument remains in the
grantor,n the statement referred to with reference to voluntary settlements appears to have no particular significance. It bas however
been quoted from time·to time, 72 and it appears to be responsible for
the view, asserted in two or three states, that in the case of a voluntary settlement, especially when made in favor of an infant, the law
will make stronger_presumptions in favor of delivery than in other
cases.73 In one state it has even been said that in case of such a set- ·
tlement the burden of proof is on the grantor to show that there
was no delivery.n Why there should be a relaxation of the require.. Bouvier Jaeger Coal Co. v. SJ,'f>her, 186 Fed. 6.w.
"'Equitable J.forigage Co. v. Brown, 105 Ga. 475; HalluntJay v. Cook, 258 -Ill. !)!?,
101 N. E • .227; .>,fcC11ne v. Goodwillie, zo4 Mo. 306.
""Go11Td v. Day, 94 U. S. 405; Ir. re Jm:kscm Brid & Tile Co., 189 Fed. 636;
Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. 104; Bruner v. Hart (Fla.), 51 So. 593: Rodemeil!r v. Braam,
r69 111. 347; B11nneil v. B11nnell, III Ky. 566; Patrick v. HmDard, 47 Mich. 40•
.. See Cooley v. Cooley, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 520; D011.U.11e v. S"'"""~ (Cal.), 153 Pac..
;oS; T~cccdalc v. Barnett (Cal.), 156 Pac.. 483; Tupper v. Foulkes, 9 C.. B~ N. S. 797.
10 Sowerbye v. Arden, 1 Johns, Ch. 240.
•
n Ante note 8.
""See 1¥allace v. Berdcll, 97 N. Y. 13; Brya11 v. Wash, 7 DL 55;; r Perry, Trusts.
§ 103 •

.,. !>filler v. Meers, 155 UL .284; ~imer v. Latimer, 174 DL 418; A1'bott v • .Abbott,
82 Am. St. Rep. 472; Baker v. "Hall, 214 DL 36". 73 N- E. 351; Cake 'VColec, r22 Ind. 109; Cromder v. Searcy, 203 Mo. 97; ScluJoler v. Scboler, :58 Mo. 83,
r67 S. W. 444- .
"Bryan v. TVa::Ti, 7 Ill. 557; urintcrbottom ¥. Pa!lis:>11, 152 DL 334; .Al:Oott v.
Abbott, i89 Ill. 488, 82 Am. St. Rep. 47z.. Bnt in Ha:ru ,._ Hir;res, i:;-7 DL 409, the _
necessity of a sho";ng of <lelivery even in the ca..<e of a volnnta.7 scttlemcr.t is clearly
recoi:nized.
18!) 111. 488,
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ments of proof of delivery in the case of such a settlement is not
entirely clear. It has been said that "the same degree of formality
is never required, on account of the great degree of confidence which
the parties are presumed to have in each other, and the inability of
the grantee, frequently, to take care of his own interests."75 As
a matter of fact, however, no formality is necessary in any case for
the delivery of a conveyance, and conceding the necessity of delivery,
the reasons suggested for dispensing with the ordinary proof thereof in this particular case appear somewhat inadequate. Indeed the
fact that the settlement is voluntary,. a gift merely, might well be regarded as requiring the strictest proof of delivery.76
Since an instrument of conveyance operates to transfer the title
to the property only upon delivery, the ascertainment of the date of
delivery is frequently a matter of importance. There is a ·rebuttable
presumption that the day of delivery was the day on which it is
dated,77 provided at least it is not acknowledged, or is not acknowledged on a different date. When the date of the instrument differs
from the date ·of acknowledgment, the delivery is by some courts
presumed to have taken place on the former date,78 and by some on
the latter.79 This difference of view as to whether the date of acknowledgment controls, in the absence of other evidence, appears
to be the result, to a very considerable extent at least, of a difference
of view as to the probability of delivery before acknowledgment,
and the usage of different communities in this regard might well
differ.
"Bryan v. Walsh, 7 Ill. 557.
'"See Jamison v. Craven, 4 Del. Ch. 3II; Hooper \'. Vanstr11111, 92 Minn. 406.
17 ff'illiams ""· Armstrong, 130 Ala. 389; Kimball V· Chicago, 253 111. IOS; Sweetser
v. Lowell, 33 :!Ire. 446; Sclm1eigel v. Shakman Co., 78 Minn. 142; Blair State Bank v.
B11n1Z, 61 Neb. 464; Grossen v. Oli1•cr, 37 Ore. 514; State \'. Da11a (\Vash.), 209 Pac.
291; Do11t11at v. Roberts (\V. Va.), So S. E. 819; Wheeler v. Single, 6z \Vis. 380.
"'Smith \'. Scarbrough, 61 Ark. 104; Smiley v. Fries. 104 Ill. 416; Lake Erie etc.
R. Co. v. Wlii:lu:111, 255 Ill. 514, 46 Am. St. Rep. 355, 28 L. R. A. i>12; 1.fcC011nell v.
Braum, 6 Litt CKy.) 459; Ford \'. Gregory, t<:> B. Mon. (Ky.) 1;-5; Snn.th v. Porter, 10
Gray (Mass.) 66; Cc•11ley v. Fi1111, 171 Mass. 70, 68 A'11. St. Rep. 399; (But see Migliill
\'. Town of Rowles, 224 Mass. 586, II3 N. E. 569); People v. Si:ydcr, 41 N. Y. 397;
Harriman Lafld Co. v. Hilto:i, 121 Tenn. 308; Kirb;}' v. Cartwriglit (Te.". Civ. A:ip.),
106 S. \V. 742; Beall v. Chatliarn (Te.'<. Civ. App.), 117 S. \V. 492; Harman , •• Obcrdorfcr, 33 Gratt (Va.) 497. In Calligan v. Calligan, 259 Ill. 52, 102 N. E. 247, it is
decided that the deed is to be presumed to have hcen delivered on the day of its date,
though not acknowledged till a later date, if the acknowledgment was not necessary to
the passing of the title, and only then.
"'Kitcher.er v. Jq/zlik, 85 Ka'!- 684; Loomis v. I'iull'"•'. 4~ >'.re. 299 (scmblc); Hen·
derson Y. Baltimore, 8 ?\Id. 352 (semble); Fontaine v. B,-.,11m~11's Sai1. !nst., s; ?irio. 552;
Blancliard ,._ T~·ler, 22 :Mich. 339, 86 Am. Dec. 57; .Ui//"r v. p.,tcr, 158 !\lich. 336;
Barber Asplzalt Pa:;. Co • .-. Field, 174 Mo. App. H, 161 S. W. 364; Boln>ke~· v. Furey,
12 Phila. (Pa.) 428 (semble); Kent v. Cecil (Tex. Civ. App.}, 25 S. W. 715.
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In many of the states, perhaps a majority, an acceptance of the_
conveyance by the grantee named therein has been regarded as essential to its validity.80 And it has accordingly been decided in a
number of cases that the conveyance is not effective as against the
claim of a third person which accrued, by reason of attachment,
recovery of a judgment, or purchase for value, between the time
of delivery of the instrument and the grantee's subsequent assent
thereto. SJ.
•
A conveyance was effective at common law altliough the transferee did not assent thereto or even know thereof, he always having
however the right to "disclaim,'' that is, to repudiate the conveyance
and thereby revest the title in the grantor.s:: Such is the rule in
England at the present day. 83 And in spite of the constant assertion and reassertion by the courts in this country of the necessity
of acceptance, it is difficult to av:oid the conclusion that in a number
of states the rule in this regard is the same as in England, that no
acceptance of the conveyance is necessary, though the grantee may,
if he choose, dissent and disclaim. That no acceptance is necessary
appears to be involved in the statement, made with great frequency,
""Russell , .• Mas, n ·Ark. 89, 90 S. \V. 617; Hibberd v. Smitla, 67 Cal. 547: s6
Am. Rep. 726; K110.t· v. Clark (Colo. App.), 62 Pac. 334; Sta/lines v. Newton, 110 Ga.
875; Hulick v. Scot:il, 9 Ill. r59; Abernatliie v. Ricla, 256 Ill 166, 99 N. E. 883; Wood·
b11r.•• v. Ful:er, 20 Ind. 387, 83 Am. Dec. 325; K:sle v. Kyle (Iowa). 157 K. \V. 248;
Ale.<:ancier v. De Kennel, 81 Ky. 345; Cates v. Cates, 152 Ky. 47, 153 S. \'i. 10; Ho1tlton
v. Houlton, II9 :Md. 180, 86 At. 514; Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217; l¥atso11 v. Hillman, 57 l\Iich. 607; Miller- v. McCa/cb, 208 Mo. 562; Re11nebaum v. Renncbaum, 78 N. J.
Eq. 307, 79 At. ::75, 79 N. J. Eq. ·65;i, 83 At. n18; Ar11cgaard v. ArncgaarJ, 7 N. D.
475, 75 N. \V. 79:•• 41 L. R. A. 258; Coucl: v. Addy, 35 Okla. 355, 129 Pac. 709:
La'risey v. Larise.;,, 93 S. C. 450, 77 S. E. 129 Reid \'. Gorman CS. D.), 158 N. \V. 780;
Kempner v. Rosenthal, 81 Tex. 12; Wclcli v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243; And see ante, note.
K11/1 v. Garvin, 125 llfo. 563; Rogers v. Heads Iron Foundry, 51 Neb. S-"· 3; L. R. A.
433; Welcl> v. Sackett, 12 \Vis. 243.
It has been said in this connection that while acceptance will ordinarily relate back
to the time of delivery, it will not do so to the prejudice of third persons. Hil:bcrd v.
Smith, 67 Cal. 547, 56 Am. Rep. 726.
51 Partridge v. Chapman, 81 Ill 137; Woodbu1"3• v. Fisf:cr, 20 Ind. 387. ~3 Am.
Dec. 325; (But see Emmons v. Harding, 162 Ind. 154); Day v. Griff.th, 15 Iowa u4;
Bell v. Farmers' Bank <-f Kc,,tneks, n Bush (Ky.) 34, 21 Am. Rep. 205; Simpson ,,-.
Yocm11, 172 Ky. 449, 189 S. \V. 439; Field v. Fisher, 65 :?.lich. 606; Kno:r ~·. Cl!JTk
(Colo. Arp.), 62 Pac. 334; 1foa11s v. Coleman, 101 Ga. 152; :J.fcFa.dden v. RC"ss. 14 Ind.
Ap1>. 112; Fisc!:cr Leaf c.,. "· 11'/iirpT.·. 51 .l\Io. A1>p. 181; DcrrJ.• Bai:k ,._ 1Fel>st"r, ¥.
N. H. 264; Kemp11er·v. Ro.•n11f1al. 81 Te."'<. u; Parmeke v. Simpso'I, s \Vall (U. S.) SL
Sec St-:J11e v. JVe-..JJ Enyla11d flux (',1., .:?'16 Mass. S, 102 N .. E. 9-19·
••Litt. §§ C.84, 685; J1,,1r.-.- , .• Bak,•r's Case, 3 Co. Rep• .:?6c; Tlu•mf'son v. Leach, 2
\'"1.-ut. 198; Sheppard's Tout h:,.to11e. 28-1-. See SkiJ-..i:it~s &'r.. , ... Ct1n11i11pl1a111~ S Leigh
l \"a.)

"i"·

""Siggers v. Et·ans, 2 EL & Ill. 367; Standing v. Bo:c:ring, 31 Ch. D. 286; ]lfa'lktf
v. II "ifs,,,. ( 1903), 2 Ch. 494- See article on the nature of disclaimer by F. E. Farrer,
I·:,+. in 3:> Law Q11art. Rev. 83.
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that, provided the conveyance can be regarded as beneficial in character, and as not involving any burden on the grantee, his acceptance will be presumed in the absence of any showing of dissent,64
and this though he is in entire ignorance of the conveyance.s:>
Such a statement represents a tendency, which appears to be open to
criticism,86 to express rules of substantive law in the form of rules
of presumption, a mode of expression which is particularly objectionable when, as hi this case, the thing presumed to exist is a thing
which concededly does not exist. If there is no acceptance, no rule
of law, whether or not designated a presumption, can create an acceptance. And the only- conclusion, it is submitted, to be drawn
from the decisions upholding a beneficial conveyance even in the
absence of acceptance, is that acceptance is not necessary in the·
case of such a conveyance. The adoption of the double fiction,
that acceptance is necessary, and that it exists although confessedly
it does not exist, 'has, it is conceived, no reason whatsoever of policy
or convenience in its favor.
The assertion of a presumption of acceptance, as it appears in the
cases referred to, is objectionable, it is submitted, not only as involving the introduction of confusing and unnecessary fictions, but also
because it in effect differentiates, as regards the necessity of acceptance, between conveyances which are and are not beneficial.
Sine~ the grantee, so long as he has n.ot actually accepted the trans.. Arrington v. Arrington, I22 Ala. 5Io; Graham v. S11ddeth (Ark.), I33 S. W. I033;
De Lcvillian '"·Edwards, 39 Cal. 120; Merrills v. Swift, I8 Conn. 257, 46 Am. Dec. JI5;
:t.roore v. Giles, 49 Conn. 570; Baker v. Hall, 2I4 DI. 364, 73 N. E. 35I; Brem111erman
v. Jennings, IOI Ind. 253; Emmons v. Harding, I62 Ind. I54, 70 N. E. I42; Podhajsk)~s
Estate, I37 Iov..,. 745, II5 N. \V. 596; Gideon v. Gideon, 99 Kan. 334; Jefferson Count;y
Buildir.g Ass'f& v. Heil, 8I Ky. 5I3; Houlton v. Houlton, II9 Md. I8o. 86 At. 5I4;
Ingersoll v. Odenda1il, I36 Minn. 428, I62 N. W. 525; Metcalfe v. Brandon, 60 Miss. 685;
Ensworth v. King, 50 Mo. 477; Jones v. Swayze, 42 N. J. L. 279; Rcnnebaum v. Renne·
baum, 78 N. J. Eq. 427, 79 At. 309; Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406, 6 Am. Rep. 112;
Tlffl Eyck v. Whitbeck, I56 N. Y. 341; Lynch v. Johnson, I7I N. C. 6u; 89 S. E. GI;
Arnegaard v. Arnegaa>"d, 7 N. D. 475, 75 N. W. 797; 4I L. R. A. 258; Slia/Jer v.
Smith (Okla.), 156 Pac. u88, (voluntary deed); In re Braley's Estate (Vt.), 82 At. 5;
Gtlggenheimer v. Lockridge, 39 W. Va. 457. In Ward v. Rittc11ho11sc Coal Co., I52 Ky.
228, I53 S. W. 2I7, it is said that acceptance is not to be implied or presumed if the
grantee is competent and is present in person.
•Elsberry v. Bo~,'ki1', 65 Ala. 336; Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Cranshaw (Ala.), 53 So.
8I2; Rs1ssell v. Mas (Ark.), 90 S. W. 61n Tibballs v. Jacobs, SI Conn. 428; In ra
B~lr.s Estate (Iowa), I33 S. W. 1033; Bure... v Nicholson (Iowa), I37 N. W. 1066;
Wllester v. Folin, 60 Kan. 334, 56 Pac. 490; Clark v. CresWell, n2 Md. 339; Roepke
v. N11t.;ma,. (Neb.), I46 Mo. 939 (conditional delivery); Vreeland v. Vreeland, 48 N. J.
Eq. 56; E::erett v. Everett, 48 N. Y. 218; illuno:: v. Wilson, III N. Y. 295; Salt::siedcr
v. S~der, 2I9 N. Y. 523, II4 N. E. 856 (conditional delivery); Robbins v. Roscoe,
120 N. C. 79, 38 L. R. A. 238, 58 Am. St. Rep. 774; Mitchell's Lessee v. Rsan, 3 Ohio
St. 377.
"'See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 326, 335, 351; " Chamberlayne, Evidence, §§ Io87, n45, n46, n6o et seq.
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fer, can disclaim, and so exclude any possibility of prejudice to him
by reason of the conveyance, it is not readily perceived why the
courts should undertake to discriminate in this regard. VVhether
the conveyance shall be eventually availed of by the grantee is a
matter for him to decide, and it does not appear to be the province of
the court to indulge in suppositions as to his probable action in this
respect. If acceptance is otherwise not necessary, why should the
non beneficial character of the conveyance render it necessary? If
it is othenvise necessary, why should the beneficial character of the
conveyance render it unnecessary? Such a distinction, based on_ the
beneficial or onerous character of the conveyance, has been repudiated in England/'7 but has been applied in several cases in this country/~ with the effect of invalidating a conveyance not actually accepted, because not regarded by the court as beneficial in character,
although, in these same jurisdictions, a "beneficial" conveyance
"·ould have been upheld without any acceptance. If an actual assent
or acceptance, it may be remarked, is to be r~garded as necessary
whenever any burden or obligation is imposed on the grantee, it is
somewhat difficult to understand the decisions, hereafter referred
tosa which uphold the validity of a conveyance in trust, although the
trustee has riot assented thereto.
The view that assent or acceptance on the part of the grantee is
necessary appears to have had its origin, for the most part, in the
notion that a· conveyance is a contract, and that consequently there
must be a meeting of minds.90 But a conveyance is not a contract,91
and there is no intrinsic difficulty in regarding a conveyance as effectiY~ to vest property in the grantee even before the latter has consented to receive it. In the case of a devise, as well as in that of a
" •· Al:::iost e'·ery conveyance, in truth, entails some charge or obligation which may
be onerous in the way of covenant or liability; and we think it much safer that one
ser~:al rule should prevail, than that the courts should be asked in each particnlar
in>ta,,ce if the deed may not be considered onerous." Campbell, C. J. in Siggers v.
E:ar..;, :; El. & Bl. 367.
"' Occasionally a conveyance has been regarded as not beneficial because it wa.S made
i:1 the performance of a contract of sale, which imposed an obligation for the purchase
rnor.e~· upon the purchaser. Derry Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 268; Boardman v. Dean,
;;.; Pa. :z:;::i; Wood v • •liontpelier, (Vt.), 82 At. 671. And a mortgage or conveyance
to se.:ure :several creditors bas been regarded as not beneficial for the reason that its
a.:ceptaT!ce by any one of the creditors" might result in precluding l1is recovery of the
wh.:-le oi hi$ claim. Jolinson v. Farley, 45 N. H. 505. A conveyance made to one
me:eh· as a conduit of title bas been regarded as not beneficial for this purpose. Little
\". Eaio11, z67 Ill. 263, 108 N. E. 7:z7. Compare Ferrell v. Childress. 1;2 Ky. t6o, 18g
$. "". 1149. where a conveyance so made was regarded as properly accepted by the
pe:5~r. benericially interested in its execution.
"' Po;ot note 95.
~-'See n·elcli v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243; Rogers Heads Iron Foundry, 51 Neb. 521; 37
L. R. A. 433.
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transfer by operation of law, the ownership p~sses without reference to whether the transferee has consented to _take the property,
and the same might well occur in the case of a voluntary transfer
inter vivos, provided only the transferee has the privilege of subsequently refusing the transfer. 92 In support of this view reference
may be made to the case of conveyances to infants and persons non
compos mentis, and to that of conveyances in trust, discussed in the
two following paragraphs.
In the case of a conveyance to an infant, or to a person non compos
mentis the courts, even those which assert most positively t~e ne-.
c~ssity, in the ordinary cas£:, of an actual acceptance, undertake to
avoid the difficulty of requiring acceptance on the part of one incapable of giving it, by asserting that in such case the assent of the
grantee will be conclusively presumed, provided at least the conveyance is beneficial in character.93 But, as before remarked, the conceded lack of acceptance cannot well be supplied by a presumption
that the grantee would, if Ire had an opportunity, accept the conveyance, and moreover, even supposing this could be done, the presumed
acceptance, in the case of a conveyance to an infant, or to a person
n01i compos mentis would be an acceptance by a person lacking in
legal capacity, and therefore a nullity.
In the case of a conveyance in trust, the legal title is usually regarded as vesting in the trustee 'vithout any acceptance by him, or
even any knowledge on his part of the conveyance,94 this result
01 Anson, Contracts (13th ed.) 3, 4; Pollock, Contracts, Appendix A; Hammon, Con·
tracts, §§ 6, 7, note I I ; Clark, Contracts, II.
Nor does a contract necessarily involve a meeting of the minds of the parties. "The
contractual obligations which the common law recognized ;vere enforced, and ai:e -still
enforced, not because those obligations are the result of agreement, but because certainforms of procedure afforded remedies for certain wrongs." Harriman, Contracts, (2nd
ed.) § 6II.
"'If a father should die testate, devising an estate to his daughter, and the latter
should afterwards die without a_ knowledge of the will, it would hardly be contended
that the devise became void for want of acceptance, and that the heirs of the devisee
must lose the estate. Neither will it be denied that equitable estates are every day
thrust upon people by deeds, or assignments, made in trust for their benefit, nor will
it be said that such beneficiaries take nothing until they assent. Add to these the estates
that are thrust upon people by the statute of descent, and we begin to estimate the
value of the argument, that a man shall not be made a property holder against his will.
Thurman, C. J. in Mitcliell's Lessee v. Ryan, 3 Ohio St. 377.
"'Staggers v. Wltite (Ark.), I I S. W. 139; Turner v. Tumer (Cal.), 161 Pac. 980;
Miller v. Meers, 155 Ill. 284; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191; Tausel v. Smit1' (Ind.
App.), 93 N. E. 548; Fitsgerald v. Toedt (Iowa), 120 N. \V. 465; Combs v. Ison, 168
Ky. 728, 182 N. ,V. 953; Campbell v. Knli11, 45 Mich. 513, 40 Am. Rep. 479; Fenton v.
Fenton (Mo.), 168 S. W. n52; Chambers v. Chambers, 227 Mo. 262; Bjmerland v. Eley,
IS \Vasb. IOI.
"'Adams v. Adams, 21 \Vall. 185; D1!11ol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321; 7 L. R. A. 439;
Minot , .• TiltfJn, 64 N. H. 3zr; G11lick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. E'q. 401; M;srover v. Freucli,
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being not infrequently attained on the theory of a presumption of
assent.us Even though he subsequently dissents, and refuses to accept, the conveyance does not become nugatory, but equity will appoint another trustee. 0 a 'fhe equitable interest under a deed of trust
likewise vests in the beneficiary named without any acceptance
thereof by him, or even any knowledge by him of the trust. 91 It is
sometimes said, in this connection, that one is presumed to accept
the benefit of a trust. 98
-The courts, in referring to the necessity of acceptance, do not
always clearly indicate whether it is to be regarded as an element
of delivery, or as something additional to, and separate from delivery. Perhaps they more frequently suggest the former view99
;3 K. C. 609; Read v. Robi11son, 6 \Vatts & S. 329; First Ba11k v. Holmes, 85 Pa. 23x;
Talbot v. Talbot (R. I.), 78 At. 535; Clo11d v. Calhoun, Io Rich Eq. (S. C.), 358; Furman v. Fisher, 4 Cold (Tenn.) 626, 94 Am. Dec. 2xo; Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare 67;
An:es, Cases on -Trusts (;md ed.) 229. But statements are occasionally found to th'
effect that no title vests in the trustee until he expressly or by implication accepts the
trust. I Perry, Trusts, § 259. Armstrong v. Morrill, I4 \Vall (U. S.) I38; Oscle:J
Sta:·e Co. v. Butler Comzt.\•, 1.21 :Mo. 6I4; McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 28I, 86 N. E.
139·
""Kennedy v. iVire, So Ala. 165; De..oe v. Dye, 123 Ind. 32I, 7 L. R. A. 439;
Howry v. Gardner, 4I Ohio St.· 642; J.fcK-foney v. Rl1oads, 5 \Vatts (Pa.) 343; E:;rick
v. Hetrick, I3 Pa. 488; Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head (Tenn.) 67; Bowden v. Parrisli, 8G
Va. 67, 19 Am. St. Rep. 873.
""lr·.1ir.e v. D1mlza111, III U. S. 327; Smith v. Da•·is, 90 Cal. 25; Dailey v. New
Ha:·e11, 60 Conn. 314; Bra.-wc/l v. Downs, I I Fla. 62; French v_ Northern Tt·ust Co.,
~97 111. 30; Brandon v. Carter, II9 ?.lo. 572, 41 Am. St. Rep. 673; King v. Donelly, 5
Paige (K. Y.) 46; Roseman v. Roseman, I27 K. C. 494; Talbot v. Talbot (R. I.), 78
At. 535; Clond v. Calhoun, ro Rich Eq. (S. C.) 358.
"'Brooks v. Marbury, I I Wheat (U. S.) 78; Security Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
Farrady (Del. Ch.), S2 At. 24; Kocli v. Strenter, 232 Ill. 594; 83 N. E. 1072; Millwllam!
v. H1 halen, 89 :Md. 216; Boston v_. T11rner, 20I 1\fass. 190; .Mar~11ette v. W'ilkiliso11, u9
Mich. 4q, 78 N. W. 474, 43 L. R. A. 840; Gulick ,._ Gr<lic-k, 39 N. J. Eq. 4ox; Martin
v. Fm:k, i5 X. Y. IJ4, JI Am. Rep. 446; ,\[olo11cy v. Tilton, 22 N. Y. Misc. 682, 51
N. Y. Supp. 682; Breedlove v. Stump, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 257; Skipwitli's E:r'r v. Cun11i11gliam, 8 Leigh (Va.) 272; Flep11or v. He11s!cJ.• (Va.), !>3 S. E. 582; c;1111cctic11t River
Sav. Ba11k v. Albee, 64 Vt. 57I. See l\fcEwe11 v. Bamberger, 3 Lea (Tenn.) 576.
98 Bronson v. HcnrJ.', I40 Ind. 455; Emporia First Nat. Bank v. Ridenour, 46 Kan.
;18, 26 Am. St. Rep. 167; H. B. Cartwriglzt & Bro. v. U11itcd State.• Ba11k & Tr11st Co.
(N. M.), I67 Pac. 436; Stone v. King, 7 R. I. 358, 84 Am. Dec. 557; Cio11d v. Callioun,
IO Rich Eq. (S. C) 358; Furman v. Fislier, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 626, 94 Am. Dec. 557.
"'Stallings v. Nc-.11to11, uo Ga. 875; Brc111111erman v. Jc11nings, 101 Ind. 253; O'Con11or v. O'Co1:11or, 100 Iowa 476; Bscrs v. s1,e11ecr, IOI IU. 429, 40 Am. Rep. 212;
Meigs v. Derter, I72 Mass: 217; Miller v • .llcCalcb, 208 Mo. 562; Jacks<m v. Phipps, I2
Johns 4I8; Spencer v. Carr, 45 N. Y. 406, 6 Am. Rep. u2; Sullivan v. Sullivan (Ky.),
20I s.
24.
OccasionaUy it has been said that delivery and acceptance must be simultaneous.
Hulick v. Sco:il, 9 Ill. I59; Clmrcl: v. Gilman, 15 Wend (N. Y.) 656, 30 Am. Dec. 82.
Contra: Regan v. Howe, I2I Mass. 424; IVcleh v. Sackett, 12 \Vis. 243; Sullivan v.
S111li.-a1• (Ky.), .20I S. \V. 24. And see Sto11e v • •l\'cw Engla11d Bor Co., 216 Mass. 8,
102 X. E. 949.
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and this they apparently do in effect when they state that the grantor's record of the instrument does not create any presumption of
delivery without the knowledge or assent of the grantee.10(1 There
would seem, however, to be some difficulties in the way of regarding the grantor's indication of intention as constituting delivery
only when accompanied or immediately followed by acceptance.
Adopting such a view, the grantor would, after having indicated his
intention that the conveyance should operate, have the right until
acceptance to change his intention, and to dispose othenvise of the
property, and yet the cases appear to regard his indication of inten. tion, in the case both of conditional101 and unconditional delivery,102 as putting the property entirely out of his control. It is more
satisfactory, it is submitted, conceding that acceptance is necessary,
to regard it as something outside of delivery, as, in effect, an indication of the grantor's attention.103 The contrary view, above referred
to, is apparently to some extent the outcome of the mistaken tendency to regard delivery as involving a manual transfer of the instrument, such a transfer being ordinarily impossible without the assent
of the person to whom the transfer is made.
The acceptance may, it has been said, be given by another person
acting on behalf of the grantee, such .acceptance being sufficient if
afterwards ratified by the grantee.104 Such a statement is somewhat
ambiguous. If it means that, provided an unauthorized person ac-.
cepts on behalf of the grantee, title immediately vests in the latter,
subject to an option on his part as to whether he will ratify the acceptance, this appears to be the equivalent of a statement that,
although there is no valid acceptance, title immediately passes to ·
the grantee subject to an option in him subsequently to repudiate
the trans£ er, this being the common law and present English rule.
It may however mean that an unauthorized acceptance being invalid,
title does not pass until the grantee, by indicating !lis adoption of
the acceptance, in effect himself accepts the eonveyance, this in ef11"

Ante, note

52.

101 See 14 Columbia Law Rev. at p. 394112 Ante,
1 00 Such

note 25.
a view is involved in the occasional statements that the acceptance may lie
given by the grantee even after the grantor's death. Cates v. Cates, 152 Ky. 47, 153
S. W. 10; Taylor v. Sanford. (Tex.), 193 S. W. 661; Burkey v. Burkey (Mo.), 175 S. W.
623; Gulf Red Cedar Co. V· Cra11Shaw (Ala.), 53 So. 812.
10&Mcigs ''·Dexter, 172 Mass. 217, 52 N. E. 75; Colle/• v. Adds, 35 Okla. 35~, 129·
Pac. 709.
In Blackwell v. Blackwell, 196 Mass. 186, 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 1070, it was decided that there may be a valid acceptance by the grantor in behalf of the grantee,
whose gene~ agent he was. The cases cited in support of the decision merely involved
the principle that no manual transfer of the instrument is necessary.
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feet recogmzmg the asserted American rule, that the grantee's
acceptance is necessary. Whichever meaning is given to the statement, it does not appear that the unauthorized acceptance has any
legal significance, the grantee's ratification of such acceptance, so
called, being merely his acceptance of the transfer, of which there
had previously been no valid acceptance.
Baltimore, Md.
HERBERT T. Trl"l"ANY.

